The following is the text of an open letter to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke signed by several economists, along with investors and political strategists, most of them close to Republicans:
We believe the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchase plan (so-called “quantitative easing”) should be reconsidered and discontinued. We do not believe such a plan is necessary or advisable under current circumstances. The planned asset purchases risk currency debasement and inflation, and we do not think they will achieve the Fed’s objective of promoting employment.
We subscribe to your statement in the Washington Post on November 4 that “the Federal Reserve cannot solve all the economy’s problems on its own.” In this case, we think improvements in tax, spending and regulatory policies must take precedence in a national growth program, not further monetary stimulus.
We disagree with the view that inflation needs to be pushed higher, and worry that another round of asset purchases, with interest rates still near zero over a year into the recovery, will distort financial markets and greatly complicate future Fed efforts to normalize monetary policy.
The Fed’s purchase program has also met broad opposition from other central banks and we share their concerns that quantitative easing by the Fed is neither warranted nor helpful in addressing either U.S. or global economic problems.
Cliff AsnessAQR Capital
Michael J. BoskinStanford UniversityFormer Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisors (George H.W. Bush Administration)
Richard X. BoveRochdale Securities
Charles W. CalomirisColumbia University Graduate School of Business
Jim ChanosKynikos Associates
John F. CoganStanford UniversityFormer Associate Director, U.S. Office of Management and Budget (Reagan Administration)
Niall FergusonHarvard UniversityAuthor, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World
Nicole GelinasManhattan Institute & e21Author, After the Fall: Saving Capitalism from Wall Street—and Washington
James GrantGrant’s Interest Rate Observer
Kevin A. HassettAmerican Enterprise InstituteFormer Senior Economist, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Roger HertogThe Hertog Foundation
Gregory HessClaremont McKenna College
Douglas Holtz-EakinFormer Director, Congressional Budget Office
Seth KlarmanBaupost Group
William KristolEditor, The Weekly Standard
David MalpassGroPacFormer Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary (Reagan Administration)
Ronald I. McKinnonStanford University
Dan SenorCouncil on Foreign RelationsCo-Author, Start-Up Nation: The Story of Israel’s Economic Miracle
Amity ShlaesCouncil on Foreign RelationsAuthor, The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression
Paul E. SingerElliott Associates
John B. TaylorStanford UniversityFormer Undersecretary of Treasury for International Affairs (George W. Bush Administration)
Peter J. WallisonAmerican Enterprise InstituteFormer Treasury and White House Counsel (Reagan Administration)
Geoffrey WoodCass Business School at City University London
Bolding mine.
Some people (the undersigned) wrote a letter to Ben Bernanke about how they think QE2 is a terrible terrible idea. I mean, whatever. It’s not the best of ideas, but we don’t got many other options.
I wonder what tax and fiscal policy measures these guys are going to prescribe. I assume that it’s going to be “extend tax cuts to all and cut spending” nonsense.
UPDATE: Dick Bove, one of the signers of the document, says that “taxes should go higher.”
I really don’t know if we have the kind of expertise to figure out when inflation is going to start picking up and stop any further money printing before inflation exceeds the fed’s mandate. I also don’t agree with all these people who’re comparing the US to Weimar Germany and Argentina one bit.
Here’s Martin Wolf from the Financial Times:
The sky is falling, scream the hysterics: the Federal Reserve is pouring forth dollars in such quantities that they will soon be worthless. Nothing could be further from the truth. As in Japan, the policy known as “quantitative easing” is far more likely to prove ineffective than lethal. It is a leaky hose, not a monetary Noah’s Flood.
So what is the Fed doing? Why is it doing it? Why are the criticisms ludicrous? What should the Fed be doing, instead?
The answer to the first is clear. As the Fed stated on November 3, “to promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate, the [federal open market] committee decided today to expand its holdings of securities. The committee will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings. In addition, the committee intends to purchase a further $600bn of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75bn per month.”
Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, gave the rationale in a speech last month. He pointed out that US unemployment is far above any reasonable estimate of equilibrium.
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The Fed, added the chairman, has a dual mandate, to foster maximum employment and price stability. Doing nothing would be incompatible with this obligation. The only question is what is to be done. The answer is the proposed purchases of Treasury bonds. This simply extends classic open market operations up the yield curve. It would also only expand the Fed’s balance sheet by about a quarter, or around 4 per cent of gross domestic product. Is the US really on the same road as the Weimar Republic? In a word, no.

It is hardly a surprise that Wolfgang Schäuble, finance minister of Germany, thinks differently. He describes the US growth model as in “deep crisis”, adding that “it’s not right when the Americans accuse China of manipulating exchange rates and then push the dollar exchange rate lower by opening up the flood gates”. Presumably, he believes that, in a proper world, the US would be forced to follow the deflationary route imposed upon Greece and Ireland, instead. This is not going to happen. Nor should it.
Boiled down, the criticisms of the Fed come down to two: its policies are leading to hyperinflation; and they are “beggar my neighbour”, in consequence, if not intention.
The first of these criticisms is not just wrong, but weird. The essence of the contemporary monetary system is creation of money, out of nothing, by private banks’ often foolish lending. Why is such privatisation of a public function right and proper, but action by the central bank, to meet pressing public need, a road to catastrophe? When banks will not lend and the broad money supply is barely growing, that is just what it should be doing (see chart).
The hysterics then add that it is impossible to shrink the Fed’s balance sheet fast enough to prevent excessive monetary expansion. That is also nonsense. If the economy took off, nothing would be easier. Indeed, the Fed explained precisely what it would do in its monetary reportto Congress last July. If the worst came to the worst, it could just raise reserve requirements. Since many of its critics believe in 100 per cent reserve banking, why should they object to a move in that direction?
Now turn to the argument that the Fed is deliberately weakening the dollar. Any moderately aware person knows that the Fed’s mandate does not include the external value of the dollar. Those governments that have piled up an extra $6,800bn in foreign reserves since January 2000, much of it in dollars, are consenting adults. Not only did no one ask China, the foremost example, to add the huge sum of $2,400bn to its reserves, but many strongly asked it not to do so.
It is also simply false to argue that the weakening dollar is due to Fed policies alone. Indeed, anyone with half a brain should realise that the US can no longer combine a large trade deficit with a manageable fiscal position. Those who want their US bonds to stay sound should welcome anything that helps the US expand domestic demand and rebalance its external position. Current US monetary policies are, contrary to Mr Schäuble’s views, simply the yang to the yin of east Asian mercantilism.
More fundamentally, market forces, not monetary policy, are pushing global rebalancing, as the private sector tries to put its money where it sees the opportunities. The Fed’s monetary policies merely add a twist. Instead of all the futile bleating, what was needed was a co-ordinated appreciation of the currencies of the emerging economies. The fault here does not lie with the US. I sympathise strongly with a Brazil or a South Africa, but not with China.
The sky is not falling. But this does not mean the Fed’s policies are the best possible. It is probable that any impact on the yields on medium-term bonds will have a modest economic effect. It would be far better if the Fed could shift inflation expectations upwards, by issuing a commitment to offset a prolonged period of below-target inflation with one of above-target inflation. A decision to monetise additional government spending might be an even more effective tool. Equally necessary is a plan to accelerate the restructuring of the overhang of excessive debt. But, in the absence of co-operation with the newly elected Congress, what the Fed is doing is, alas, about the most we can now expect, though it should have dared to do more. Meanwhile, “sound” people will shriek that the sky is falling only to be surprised that it is not. We have seen this play before – in Japan in the 1990s. Japan fell into chronic deflation, instead.
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Also, here’s Alan Blinder in defense of Ben Bernanke:
Ignorance is not bliss, especially when your economy is faltering and sound policies are badly needed.
For months, we have witnessed the spectacle of people arguing that Keynes was wrong. Somehow, additional government spending actually reduces employment—even when the economy has huge amounts of spare capacity and unused labor desperate for work; even when the central bank will prevent interest rates from rising to “crowd out” private spending. Really?
One current catchphrase is “job-killing spending.” Hmmm. How, exactly, does more spending kill jobs when there is idle capacity and no threat of rising interest rates? Stumped? So am I.
The anti-Keynesian revival has been disheartening enough. But now the economic equivalent of the Flat Earth Society is turning its fury on Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve. Critics ranging from German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble to tea party favorite Sarah Palin—which is quite a range—have spoken as if Bernanke & Co. have lost their marbles and are embarking on a wild policy misadventure.
All in all, it looks like the nation and the world need an Economics 101 refresher. So let’s start with the basics.
The Fed’s plan is to purchase about $600 billion of additional U.S. government securities over about eight months, creating more bank reserves (“printing money”) to do so. This policy is one version of quantitative easing, or “QE” for short. And since the Fed has done QE before, this episode has been branded “QE2.”
Here’s the first Economics 101 question: When central banks seek to stimulate their economies, how do they normally do it? If you answered, “by lowering short-term interest rates,” you get half credit. For full credit, you must explain how: They create new bank reserves to purchase short-term government securities (in the U.S., that’s mostly Treasury bills). Yes, they print money.
But short-term rates are practically zero in the U.S. now, so the Fed wants to push down medium- and long-term interest rates instead. How? You guessed it: by creating new bank reserves to purchase medium- and long-term government securities.
That sounds pretty similar to garden-variety monetary policy. Yet critics are branding QE2 a radical departure from past practices and a dangerous experiment.
The next charge is that QE2 will be inflationary. Partly true. The Fed actually wants a bit more inflation because, now and for the foreseeable future, inflation is running below its informal 1.5% to 2% target. In fact, there’s some concern that inflation will dip below zero—into deflation. The Fed, thank goodness, is determined to stop that. We don’t want to be the next Japan now, do we?
But might the Fed err and produce too much inflation? Yes, it might, leaving us with, say, 3% inflation instead of 2%. Or it might err in the opposite direction and produce only 1%. Neither outcome is desirable, but each is quite tolerable. To create the fearsome inflation rates envisioned by the more extreme critics, the Fed would have to be incredibly incompetent, which it is not.
The final major charge, levied especially by a number of foreign officials, is that the Fed’s new policy amounts to currency manipulation: deliberately lowering the international value of the dollar to gain competitive advantage for U.S. exporters. Is there any truth to this? Not if words have any meaning.
Economics 101 teaches us that one standard side effect of a central bank reducing interest rates is a lower exchange rate. Actually, things don’t always work out that way in the real world; sometimes the stronger growth pushes the currency up instead. This contradictory evidence notwithstanding, it is commonly assumed that expansionary monetary policy depreciates the currency. That’s why some foreign governments, especially the more mercantilist ones, are apoplectic. What’s down for us is up for them.
But calling QE2 “currency manipulation” is a grotesque abuse of language. After all, the U.S. dollar is a floating currency. Many factors, including but certainly not limited to monetary policy, influence the exchange rate, which changes every minute. But the Fed will not intervene to push the dollar down. If the dollar should rise instead of falling, c’est la vie.
More important, the U.S. is a sovereign nation with a right to its own monetary policy. So I was stunned when a top aide to the Russian president suggested that the Fed should consult with other countries before making major policy decisions. Come again? An independent central bank doesn’t even consult with its own government.
Finally, there’s that old hobgoblin: consistency. Critics tell us that QE2 won’t give the U.S. economy much of a boost but will lead to rampant inflation. Both? How does that work?
If buying Treasurys is a weak policy tool, a view with which I have some sympathy, then it shouldn’t be very inflationary. There is no magic link between growth of the central bank’s balance sheet and inflation. People, businesses and banks have to take actions—like spending more, investing more, and lending more—to connect the two. If they don’t, we will get neither faster growth nor higher inflation, just more idle bank reserves.
What the Fed proposes to do is neither foolproof nor perfect. Frankly, it’s not the policy I would choose. As I’ve written on this page, I’d like the Fed to purchase private securities and to reduce the interest rate it pays on reserves, even turning it negative. The latter would blast reserves out of banks into some productive uses.
But I don’t run the Fed. Maybe Chairman Bernanke’s ideas are better than mine and, in any case, the planned QE2 is far better than doing nothing. It is not a shot in the dark, not a radical departure from conventional monetary policy, and certainly not a form of currency manipulation.
I know Ben Bernanke. Ben Bernanke is a friend of mine. And critics ranging from Mr. Schauble to Ms. Palin are no Ben Bernankes.
Mr. Blinder, a professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton University and vice chairman of the Promontory Interfinancial Network, is a former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve.
Both Mr. Wolf and Mr. Blinder suggest that they would rather see the fed pursue alternative options (the latter puts forth some options, too) and I’m inclined to say that Mr. Blinder’s suggestions might be pretty useful.